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We propose a growth model, that incorporates both an individual
and a communal aspect of Social Capital. In our model, sold output
increases with the stock of business contacts (Relational Capital as
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based on matching theory. The cost of creating contacts decreases
with more Community level Social Capital and Market Institutions.
We argue that innovation needs the purposeful destruction of old
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11 Introduction
In this paper we propose a theory of social capital and economic develop-
ment. Our model uses matching theory to capture the role of social capital
in the presence of search frictions between market parties. In a nutshell, we
argue that contacts with trading partners are a productive input. We name
these contacts Relational Capital. Breaking contacts with old trading part-
ners is done by rational proﬁt maximising ﬁrms and is a necessary aspect
of the upgrading of technology, but has a negative externality on the former
trading partners. We call this creative destruction. The costs of making new
contacts are aﬀected by Community Level Social Capital and by Market In-
stitutions. Higher levels of either decreases the cost of information and hence
increase the arrival rate of contacts per unit of labour. The main diﬀerence
between political systems in our model stems from interference with creative
destruction. This may occur through hindering market institution develop-
ment, through corruption, or through direct political interference. We set
up and simulate a growth model with these ingredients and base most of
its elements on micro search arguments. As variations, we endogenise the
role of politics in frustrating creative destruction, and we model a feed-back
between the total stock of RC and the labour costs of making more contacts.
This paper relates to many literatures - empirical and theoretical - and
we defer a discussion of most items till after the model description. Here,
we only want to discuss the relation with the theoretical literature on social
capital.
The two dominant views of social capital in the literature diﬀer mainly in
the level of aggregation of social capital.1 In the ﬁrst approach, social capital
is deﬁned as individuals’ number of contacts and their ability to generate
contacts. The second approach describes social capital as a set of community
1For recent reviews, see Sobel (2002), or Durlauf (2002). Sobel, noting the confusion in
the literature about the meaning of social capital, calls it ‘multi-faceted’. Durlauf (2002)
seems sceptical about the whole literature and wants ‘sharper theoretical modelling’ to
bring the analyses up to ‘the standards in the ﬁeld’.
2norms, such as trust. Our model relates to both.
The individualistic view of social capital is exempliﬁed by Glaeser et
al. (2002), who deﬁne social capital as ‘a person’s social characteristics -
including social skill, charisma, and the size of his Rolodex - which enable
him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions with others’.
By doing so they implicitly concur with Arrow’s (1999) point that ‘capital’
suggests a resource that can be individually accumulated. They take this
to imply that the term social capital should not be used for attributes that
are not accumulable at the individual level. In their analysis, Glaeser at al.
(2002) mostly focus on individual contacts, identiﬁed by Putnam (2000) and
Burt (2000) as the size of one’s network of contacts, and they essentially
treat investments in contacts on a par with investments in education.
Our notion of Relational Capital is also individualistic.2 RC is the stock
of relations that households and ﬁrms need for selling outputs and buying
inputs. We model this by having RC as an input in the production of sold
output. RC as an individual asset is close to Glaeser et al.’s (2002) notion of
social capital, and like them we provide a theory for why and how it changes
over time. The main diﬀerence between our model and that of Glaeser et al.
(2002) is that the destruction of RC is not only possible, but necessary for
technological growth.
The second view of social capital is that it measures ‘trust’, ‘community
networks’, or, more generally, some form of adherence to community norms.
For instance, Robison et al. (2002) argue that social capital should be viewed
as ’sympathy’ among agents in a society. Likewise, Bowles and Gintis (2002)
argue that social capital does not equate with an individual asset, but is a
form of capital on the community level. The proponents of this view hold that
the costs of ﬁnding trading partners is aﬀected by (community) social capital.
We incorporate this second concept by modeling a matching process where
frictions depend on the level of community level social capital (CSC). We
2Frijters(2000) introduces a related concept of relational capital on the ﬁrm level and
analyses the consequences for the wage and age structure of employees within a ﬁrm.
3argue that CSC determines the eﬃciency of searching for new contacts, which
is a point we share with Bowles and Gintis (2002). Unlike them however,
the same search-improvement role is also performed by Market Institutions,
which we hence view as substitutes for CSC. Additionally, in our simulations
we model a thick-market externality by including a feedback from levels of
RC and production on the costs of making contacts, via a change in CSC and
MI. This feedback creates a poverty trap, where an economy can be stuck for
a long time in a situation of a small stock of RC coupled with high labour
costs of creating more RC.
One of the classic references to social capital, Coleman (1988), also in-
cludes an individual/communal dichotomy. Coleman (1988) writes that agents
in a functioning economy need to advance resources to other agents and re-
ceive virtual ‘credit slips’ in exchange. On the individual level, the number
of ‘credit slips’ agents hold is a measure of their social capital. Community
norms, a form of CSC, ensure that debts are repaid. Coleman’s concept of
credit slips does have a productive aspect to it in the sense that they promote
specialisation: Coleman states that within a relationship partners exchange
these ‘credit slips’ in diﬀerent dimensions, such that within a partnership one
party can be a creditor with respect to one dimension (for example providing
a ﬁnancial credit) but a debtor in another (for example market information).
This diﬀers from our conception of RC because even someone whose balance
of ‘credit slips’ is zero can have many trading relations (high RC) and hence
also enjoy the advantages of specialisation.
With respect to innovation and social capital, Routledge and von Ams-
berg (2003) provide a game-theoretical model of social capital. They, too,
look at contacts between trading partners and argue that technological in-
novation needs the replacement of contacts. One diﬀerence is that in their
model entities only have a ﬁxed number of trading partner whilst in ours,
the number of partners can be expanded to allow for more specialisation and
this is always production increasing. Hence, in our model there is additional
scope for output growth due to higher stocks of RC. Furthermore, their con-
4cept of social capital relates only to the communal aspect, namely to the
degree of trust in potential partners, whereas in ours it relates to the search
technology. The greatest diﬀerence though is that our model incorporates
other aspects of the economy too: we have labour costs of making contacts,
savings, (endogenous) political interference, and Market Institutions. Both
models serve diﬀerent purposes. Whilst Routledge and von Amsberg (2003)
focus on a very particular contact replacement mechanism, our model aims
at an economy-wide analysis of long-term patterns of development.
This paper ﬁts into a wider research agenda that looks at creative de-
struction and contacts. In Bezemer et al (2003), we thus study the transition
from socialism to capitalism using a model that includes creative destruction
but ignores the issue of social capital.
The article proceeds with the presentation of our model. The subsequent
section discusses our assumptions and concepts in more detail and provides
empirical illustrations and connections to other literature. We study the role
of RC and CSC in diﬀerent development paths and political environments in
a series of simulations in Section 4. We distinguish between exogenous ‘big
bang’ transitions, exogenous transitions of slow but inevitable change, and
endogenous developments. In the latter case, political interference and the
development of market institutions depend on the stocks of relational capital
in the economy. Section 5 concludes and raises issues for further research.
2 A Model of Relational Capital and Growth
Our economy consists of a continuum of representative ﬁrms maximizing their
proﬁt. Consumption is not explicitly considered, but ﬁrms can be viewed as
owned by households who provide a ﬁxed endowment of labor to the economy.
Households consume all of their income except a constant share s as speciﬁed
below. Firms produce a homogeneous good with unit price. Technology is
described by a production function with three inputs: labor, physical capital
and contacts of the ﬁrm. Thus, Relational Capital (RCt) is a capital stock,
5and can be thought of as the number of business contacts. It is an input in
sold output yt.
The diﬀerence to the standard deﬁnition of output is that market frictions
necessitate business contacts. Having RC as an input is our way of modelling
the search costs of ﬁnding partnerships needed for buying inputs and selling
output. We deﬁne sold output by
yt = y(A,Lt − L
rc
t ,RC t,K t) (1)
where yt is sold production at time t; Lt is the labor force, Lt−Lrc
t is net
labor input into physical production (blue collar labor); Lrc
t is (white collar)
labor devoted to the creation of RCt; At is the technology parameter; Kt
is physical capital. y(.) is a constant-returns-to-scale function with all the
usual Inada-properties: any input faces decreasing positive marginal returns
and is technically complementary to any other input.
The economy has a continuum of such ﬁrms with a measure of 1.T h i s
allows us to use ¯ yt,L t,K t, and RCt as the total amount of output, labor and
capital stocks in the whole economy. As in standard macroeconomic growth
models we assume the following functional form for our analysis
yt = y(Atf(Lt − L
rc
t ,RC t),K t) (2)
where Atf(Lt − Lrc
t ,RC t) is a single composite input: technology At is
the productivity of the combination of labor and contacts, similar to a labor
augmented (or Harrod-neutral) technology in the standard textbook model.
Assumptions on f(.) are implicitly given by the assumptions on y(.).
Firms select levels of Lt and Kt a n di n v e s ti nt h es t oc ko fRCt by allocating
labor Lrc
t . We distinguish between Drc
t , the amount of contacts replaced, and
Nrc
t , the amount of contacts added. Replacing contacts implies destroying
an old contact and creating a new one, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1 below.
Firms selecting positive levels of Drc
t and Nrc
t meet on a markets for con-
tacts. Firms, and therefore business contacts, are taken to be heterogeneous,
6leading to search frictions in the matching process. As in most of the search
literature (e.g. Pissarides, 1990; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), we do not
explicitly model this heterogeneity.3 We capture its eﬀect by positing contact







t with λt > 0,ϕt ≥ 1 (3)
where λt denotes the conversion rate of labor Lrc
t into relations. In terms
of search theory, λt can be interpreted as the arrival rate of contacts. We
capture the relation between business contacts and social or market networks
by positing that λt depends positively on both Community Social Capital
(CSCt) and Market Institutions (MIt). In the next section, we elaborate on
this and provide references to the literature.
Since destroying an old contact constitutes a negative externality (the
loss of a contact) on the old business partner, these have an incentive to
preempt by making contact destruction costly. (ϕt − 1 )i st h ec o s taﬁrm
incurs when breaking a contact with another ﬁrm, over and above the costs
of just ﬁnding a new contact. We assume that raising the cost of breaking
contacts is only possible via the political process. If there is some degree of
political interference in ﬁrms’ matching choices, ϕt ≥ 1 denotes the degree
to which the political process frustrates the replacement of contacts. In
completely decentralized economies, ﬁrms have no power to raise the cost
of breaking contact with them, and ϕt =1 : replacing and adding contacts
are equally costly to the ﬁrm doing it. Political interference in matching
choices amounts to some degree of centralization of markets. The more an
economy is centrally controlled, in this sense, the higher ϕt. We discuss this
assumption in the next section in more detail.
Contact replacement is inextricably linked to technological progress. When-
3This diﬀers from social network models such as Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) or Vega-
Redondo (2003) or the growth model of Routledge and von Amsberg (2003). In those
models the stability and/or trustworthiness of speciﬁc links between agents is analyzed. We
abstract from identities of partners by assuming these problems are captured implicitely
by a matching function.
7ever a ﬁrm increases its eﬃciency by initiating a new production method,
producing new products, or changing its internal organization, it will typi-
cally make new demands on its input suppliers or output buyers. Since old
‘transaction partners’ were selected so as to match old production and sale
processes, switching transaction partners will be optimal under new produc-
tion or sale conditions. In short, ﬁrms tend to replace contacts as they im-
prove their technology At.A si nS c h u m p e t e r( 1934) and Routledge and von
Amsberg (2003), the destruction of old contacts is an inevitable by-product
of the creation of new production and sale methods.4 We therefore term the
replacement of RC creative destruction. We explicitly model technological
progress as depending on the extent of contact replacement Drc
t :








t denotes the production frontier at time t. The function 1 >
g(.) ≥ 0 denotes technological ‘catch-up’ resulting from the replacement of
relational capital per unit of Lt. The lag between Drc
t and At reﬂects the




t > 0,g (0) = 0,a n d
∂2g(.)
∂2Drc
t < 0. Appendix 1.3
provides micro-arguments for this equation.
Because of the externality connected to replacing contacts, the level of
RC does not only depend on own investment decisions, but also (negatively)








4Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) provide a game theoretic model of SC based on
t h ei d e ao fc o o p e r a t i o ni nar e p e a t e dP r i s o n e rD i l e m m ag a m e . T om o d e lg r o w t ht h e y
assume too that new trading partners are necessary for technological advancement. In
their model faster technological development implies shorter times of interaction and hence
a destruction of CSC in the form of trust. We argue that only RC diminishes through an
externality of replacing contacts. In our model CSC can help to reduce the cost of the
externality much in line with empirical evidence (see for example Miguel’s (2003) comment
on Routledge and von Amsberg).




RCt−1 equals the probability of an old contact being
destroyed by the creative destruction decisions of other ﬁrms. This proba-
bility is derived endogenousely given a stochastic process on the micro level
which we develop in detail in Appendix 1.1. The parameter β equals the net
number of contacts that get destroyed when one ﬁrm replaces an old contact,
destroying his previous partner ﬁrm’s contact. When that ﬁrm is part of a
large value chain of interdependent ﬁrms, β is large.
Figure 1 illustrates the diﬀerence between Nrc
t and Drc
t . For simplicity,
we take β = 1.T h i sr e ﬂects the simplifying assumption that production is
pairwise, i.e. that value chains have a length of two ﬁrms. There are four
ﬁrms in total. Initially, there are productive contacts between ﬁrms 1 and
2, and between ﬁr m s3a n d4 . T h et o pe x a m p l es h o w sw h a th a p p e n sw i t h
creative destruction: ﬁrms 1 and 3 both replace one contact and form a new
contact through search and matching. Both ﬁrms improve their technology
At by doing so. Both abandon the contact they previously had with other
entities. The net eﬀect of this creative destruction is a loss of one contact.
As noted, we can extend this example to situations where the net number
of contacts that are destroyed is larger. If some of these entities are part
of a chain of contacts, the whole chain may become worthless when a single
entity in the chain pulls out. The bottom example shows what happens with
making extra contacts: without changing production processes, both entities
1 and 3 increase their number of contacts. The new contact between these
entities does not force either of them to abandon their previous contacts.
The net eﬀect is an increase in the number of contacts by one.
To close our model, we make some standard assumptions about the move-
ment of total labor units, the technological frontier and physical capital for-
mation:
9 
Figure 1: Creative destruction (replacing an old contacts) and network ex-
tension
Lt = L






We take labor to be constant and capital to follow the Swan-Solow-
assumptions of ﬁxed depreciation, constant savings rate and exogenous tech-
nological frontier progress. This speciﬁcation reﬂects assumptions on the
economy of exogenous savings, no outside investment and a given technolog-
ical frontier.
We make the standard assumption that ﬁrms maximize the discounted
stream of proﬁts equal to
P∞
t=0( 1
1+rt)t{yt − wtL − rtKt}.This is indepen-
dent of the economic system, which is here reﬂected in the centralization
parameter ϕt. This implies that we assume that economic systems do not
aﬀect optimization behavior, but they do aﬀect the constraints ﬁrms face.
For a similar assumption on ﬁrm behavior under socialism, see Roberts and
Rodriguez (1997).
103 Social Capital, Market Institutions and Pol-
itics
Our model attempts to capture key aspects of several literatures. The con-
cept of RC formalizes the idea of transaction costs and the value of informa-
tion put forward, for example, by Williamson and Masten (1999). The idea
is also implicitly present in transition models, such as those of Blanchard and
Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1999), where ﬁrms need relations to
achieve sold output.
As noted in the Introduction, RC also connects to the large empirical
social capital literature, where households with more linkages (e.g. in local
associations) are found to have higher incomes (Grootaert et al, 2002 among
others); that regions with more dense associational networks are more pros-
perous (Putnam, 2000); and that civil society in general is conducive to
economic growth (see Durlauf and Quah, 1999, for a survey of growth regres-
sions). These ﬁndings concur with our assumption that sold output relies on
RC.
The value of RC lies in the heterogeneity of trading parties. Once a re-
lation is discontinued, parties cannot easily ﬁnd other suppliers and clients
because their buying and selling transactions were partner-speciﬁc. The no-
tion that it takes time to ﬁnd suitable buyers is also present in the literature
on capacity utilization (Fagnart et al, 1999), where it is argued that not all
production is automatically sold.As in the literature on forward and back-
ward linkages (Hefner and Guimaraes, 1994), our externalities arise from
contact replacement.
We suggested that the costs of making new contacts are determined by
two factors: Community Social Capital (CSC) and the quality of market
institutions (MI). We will now argue this in more detail. Informal networks,
which constitute CSC, provide a particularly direct route for making new
business contacts because, as Malecki (2000) writes, ‘through the economic
and social relationships in the network, diverse information becomes less
11expensive to obtain’. The more widespread the network, the lower the costs
of making contacts in terms of labor time.
Another reason why CSC lowers search costs is that CSC allows trust to
develop. Trust grows in the context of family, ethnic, religious, and civil ties.
It can be deﬁned as a rational expectation that others keep their promises (as
in Nooteboom, 2002). Trust thus reduces individuals’ search, monitoring and
contracting eﬀorts. These are labor costs of contracting and enforcement.
The larger the trust developed in such networks, the faster a network of
business contacts is made, with all the associated advantages. Sobel (2002)
summarizes the large empirical literature on this issue.
Consider three empirical case studies on the importance of CSC. Murphy
(2002) reports that social networks of business people in Tanzania support
innovation in manufacturing ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that trust in these relations
is especially important as it improves the quality of information exchanges.
Grooteart et al (2002) investigate the importance for the welfare of rural
households in Burkina Faso of CSC in the form of local associations and net-
works. They ﬁnd that higher densities of local associations and networks are
associated with higher per capita household expenditures and better access
to credit. This replicates a ﬁnding by Helliwell and Putnam (1995) for Italian
regions.
As a graphical illustration of the trust-growth link, Figure 2 shows a
scatter plot of a 1981 survey measure of civic cooperation plotted against
average annual GDP growth in the 1980s for 28 middle and upper-income
countries, based on World Values Survey data (Knack and Keefer 1997).
The civic cooperation measure is a score based on answers to questions on
voluntary adherence to civic norms, such as not taking advantages of loop-
holes in social beneﬁts system. It measures the extent to which citizens are
prepared to ‘play by the rules’. As noted by Nooteboom (2002) and Knack
and Keefer (1997), rule adherence is an important dimension of trust. The
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Figure 2: Strength of civic co-operation norms and economic growth, Source:
Knack and Keefer (1997)
is 0.33 and highly signiﬁcant5. In our interpretation, this is so because trust
facilitates contact creation and contact replacement which, in turn, is essen-
tial for technological progress and growth. We support this argument below
with simulations.
We now turn to Market Institutions (MI)6. They also determine the costs
of making contacts, similar to CSC, because they likewise decrease the costs
of forming linkages between economic entities. To illustrate this point, con-
sider traditional models of perfect markets. These abstract from the diﬃculty
of ﬁnding contacts and from externalities of creative destruction. The no-
tion of perfect markets can be interpreted as the limit of having exceedingly
fast arrival rates of contacts where the creation of RC is virtually costless.
The stock of RC existing in the perfect economy is very large. Adaptation
5Knack and Keefer (1997) analyse the relation in depth in a regression analysis, con-
trolling for a number of other variables, and also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
for CIVIC across speciﬁcations and outlier treatments.
6We use the word institution not merely for the rules that these formal organizations
enforce (as in North, 1990), but also for the organizations themselves.
13of technology is fast and the economy is perennially at the technological
frontier.
If there are information frictions, heterogeneity in the quality of products
and of ﬁrms - their credit-worthiness or their reliability - matters, and so
do search costs. This creates free-riding behavior of low-quality ﬁrms on the
existence of high-quality suppliers or clients (Akerlof 1970). Market institu-
tions can overcome such information problems and associated search costs
by screening and monitoring. Private market institutions include business
associations that screen and monitor members as well as banks that con-
trol creditors and lenders. Public market institutions include credentialist
systems, such as education certiﬁcation and food standard agencies. Both
private and public MI reduce search costs by taking advantage of economies
of scale in monitoring ﬁrms, typically more so than CSC. Increasing returns
to formal screening and monitoring may explain why societies with well de-
veloped market institutions and a lower level of CSC can faster create RC,
and thereby grow at higher rates, than societies with weak MI but well de-
veloped CSC. The former are developed market economies, the latter is a
characterization of a typical developing country.
We illustrate our interpretation of MI with the importance of ﬁnancial
intermediation, measured as the average 1989-1996 ratio of total assets of
deposit money banks to 1990 GDP. We plot this against per capita GDP
levels for 40 countries. The scatter plot in Figure 3 shows the positive rela-
tion, most clearly in the lower-income countries7. In our interpretation, this
is so because the relative beneﬁt to GDP of using MI is especially large in
countries where the less eﬃcient CSC-based contacts are more prevalent.
We now turn to the link between the political system and economic growth
through contact replacement. We have deﬁned a perfect, decentralized mar-
ket as one with abundant RC and negligible search costs. In particular,
7Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) show in an extensive analysis that both of the
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Figure 3: Formal ﬁnancial Intermediation and economic development,
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002)
perfect markets are without politically supported costs of breaking contacts.
Political-economic systems may deviate from this benchmark if enterprise
decisions threaten key political interests. If creative destruction threatens
the rents of those in power, MI that foster creative destruction will be po-
litically curtailed. Creative destruction may also be more directly impeded
politically in two ways.
The ﬁrst is sheer corruption. Politicians and the bureaucrats simply veto
changes in the network of contacts if these aﬀect them negatively. To put it
bluntly: one does not easily break up contacts with the dictator’s ﬁrm.
The second way in which contact replacement may be hindered is the
ineﬃciency of direct political control. When politicians aim to steer or control
production, they eﬀectively engage in economic planning. The literature on
central planning argues that the span of control of the center is typically not
suﬃcient to gather and absorb all the information necessary to make optimal
enterprise-level decisions, among them decisions on the breaking and making
of contacts. Especially the recognition of new technological opportunities is
15a matter of local information.8
For socialist economies, this argument is well-known (e.g. Aslund 2002),
and socialist-style central planning constitutes the extreme case. But also
under dictatorial regimes, political enforcement of business contacts occurs.
In developing countries, property is often concentrated. Firms are not free
to dispense with their RC because the political center can punish them for
it. Because of this control, ﬁrms negatively aﬀected by creative destruc-
tion can lobby the political center not to allow creative destruction in other
ﬁrms. Such lobbying has indeed been observed in developing and transition
economies (Rama, 1993; Braguinsky and Yavlinsky, 2000; Gros and Stein-
herr, 1995) and was prevalent in socialist systems (Nove 1987). This directly
increases the cost of creative destruction.
Both arguments amount to the same thing: the ‘quality’ of the political
system, in terms of the economy’s growth capacity, can be seen as reﬂected
in the additional labor costs of replacing a contact over and above ﬁnding
a contact. This additional cost incurred by the ﬁrm includes additional
lobbying, bribery, administrative, or legal work involved in replacing a former
business contact. A higher ‘price’ of breaking up and replacing contacts leads
to endogenous technological backwardness. It is now widely accepted that
this was a reason for low growth in the former socialist economies. We
suggest that this may also be the case in many developing countries, which
typically have relatively high levels of political interference in enterprise-level
decision making, either through corruption or through purposeful central
coordination, or both.
In this section we provided arguments and empirical illustrations for the
assumptions made in the model section 2. To summarize, we argue that
ﬁrm contacts are a productive input. The costs of making new contacts
are aﬀected by Community Level Social Capital and by Market Institutions.
8A similar conclusion follows from the discussion of incentives and technological prop-
erty rights. The more centralized a system, the less likely it is that those at the ﬁrm level
can reap the beneﬁts of improved technology and replaced contacts.
16The main diﬀerence between political systems stems from interference with
creative destruction. This may occur through hindering MI development,
through corruption, through direct political interference, or through rais-
ing the costs of replacing contacts in some other way. All this amounts to
decreasing the scope for truly decentralized decision making. A less decen-
tralized system will have higher costs of engaging in creative destruction than
a decentralized system.
4 Scenarios of Economic Development: Sim-
ulations
The steady-state equilibrium of the model is derived in Appendix 2. As
long as ϕt < ∞, there is perpetual creative destruction and investment in
new relations to compensate for the losses of RC due to creative destruction.
Output will eventually grow at the rate of technological progress. Output
will be higher when saving rates, initial levels of production factors, and
contact rates are higher. Output will be lower the higher the discount rate
and the higher the ϕt. Because these ﬁndings are trivial and tell us little
about the dynamic properties of developing economies with systemic change,
we relegate a brief discussion to Appendix 2.
Here we concentrate on simulations. Our functional form speciﬁcation is:













which presumes a standard Cobb-Douglas production function and a sim-
ple catch-up process for technological progress. We take: γ0 =0 .65, γ =0 .7,
g0 =0 .25,g 1 =0 .8, λ(.)=λ0 =0 .1, ρ =0 .06,s=0 .3, β =1 ,a n dα =0 .02
for the ﬁrst scenario. We later discuss alternative scenarios and change λt
accordingly.
17As to the initial condition, we presume in all scenarios that the economy
starts with ϕt = ϕ = 1000.9 The technological gap with the technological
frontier at the start of each development trajectory is presumed equal to 100
years of steady state technological development. At 2 percent technological
growth per year, this works out at a technological ratio of about 1:7, which
appears a reasonable guesstimate. We note that the productivity per unit
labor has a much higher ratio than this, because the level of RC per unit of
labor will also be low at the start of the development trajectory.
Parameter assumptions are selected to reﬂect reality in various ways.
First, they imply that physical capital accounts for 30% of output, produc-
tion labor 45% and RC 25%. This measure of the importance of RC is
conservative. In a pioneering study, Machlup (1962) estimated the share of
all economic activity in the United Sates devoted to discovering and distrib-
uting information at 29 %. Porat (1977) put it close to 50 %. Second, values
for λt = λ and g0 are suﬃciently high for any economy to be able to catch up
with the technological frontier within two decades if it would invest all its re-
sources (hence forgoes all output today, which is obviously not realistic) into
technological progress via RC replacement. Third, parameter values reﬂect
standard assumptions about discount rates (6% a year), saving rates (30%
a year), and the rate of technological progress (2% a year). There remains
arbitrariness especially with respect to ϕt and λt. We discuss robustness of
our results in the last subsection of the simulations.
In many models of development, it is diﬃcult to capture the notion of
systemic change. The two parameters in our model that capture systemic
change are ϕt and λt. A ‘big-bang’ systemic change can be represented as
ao n e - o ﬀ unanticipated change in ϕt and\or λt. A continuous ‘improving’
systemic change is one where ϕt and λt continuously change, presumably in
the direction of perfect markets, i.e. low ϕt and high λt. Endogenous sys-
9This φ is so high that no creative destruction has taken place before the start of any
scenario, i.e. the starting situation is the same as the steady state situation of having
φ = ∞.
18temic change is one where ϕt and λt themselves are endogenous. In order to
organize the discussion, we will simulate various scenarios:
Scenario 1. The development path of an economy that was initially char-
acterized by the steady state of high ϕt and a low λt, where overnight all
political control is removed. Three are no costs of breaking contacts so that
ϕt = ϕ =1while also the labor costs of matching λt = λ remain constant
over time. In additional to this laisser-faire development path, we also show
the theoretically optimal path a social planner would choose. This serves as
a benchmark of what an optimal policy may be able to accomplish.
Scenario 2. The development path of an economy that was also initially
characterized by the steady state of a high ϕt and a low λt, which sets upon
a trajectory of ever decreasing ϕt and ever increasing λt. By letting ϕt de-
crease we now allow for the gradual development of MI which lower contact
matching costs, while simultaneously labor costs of contacting are falling.
Again, not only the actual development path, but also the theoretically op-
timal path is shown.
Scenario 3. The development path of an economy that was initially char-
acterized by the steady state of a high ϕt and a low λt, w h i c hs e t su p o na n
trajectory of endogenous change in ϕt and λt.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, we insert
the assumption that the larger the market network (reﬂe c t e di nt h ev a l u e
of the RCt stock), the smaller ϕt and λt. Technically, we introduce a varia-
tion on Diamond’s (1982) thick-market externality, which acknowledges that
larger networks make it less costly to form new contacts. In our context, the
intuition is that larger non-state networks (whether of a business of civil so-
ciety nature) inﬂuence politics such that the political process becomes more
conducive to creative destruction. We elaborate on this interpretation below.
194.1 Scenario 1: a transition
Scenario 1 is apt for describing some event - a systemic collapse, a coup, a
sudden policy change - that ends economic control over the economy. The
outstanding example would be the post-socialist transition countries, with
sudden and comprehensive introduction of liberalizing policy measures. We
assume throughout that ﬁrms maximize discounted-proﬁts and have rational
expectations after the shock. We contrast the outcome of their behavior with
what the optimal solution would be that an all-knowing social planner would
implement.
Concretely, we assume that at t=0, ϕt suddenly changes from 1000 (vir-
tually total political control) to 1 (no political interference at all), whilst
nothing else changes and λt = λ remains constant. Figures 4a and 4b show
the simulation results for a decentralized transition; Figures 4c and 4d depict
the ’optimal’ path.
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The decentralized development path is characterized by a large initial
decline in output, sustained over several periods. The decline in output in
the ﬁrst 7 periods is about 50%, which is mainly due to the reduction in
RC and partly due to labor used in creative destruction. Output returns
21to the initial output level only after 20 periods. These ﬁgures qualitatively
mimic the real patterns of output ﬂuctuations in formerly centrally planned
economies. The start of reform led in all 27 transition countries to a fall in
output during three to eight years, a fall ‘never before experienced in the
history of capitalist economies (at least in peacetime)’ (Mundell, 1997; see
EBRD, 2003 for ﬁgures). More generally, Greenaway et al (2002), survey
the experience of 25 developing countries which implemented ‘deep’ market
liberalization programmes. In a panel data analysis, they demonstrate that
market liberalization is typically followed by an J-curve output response over
time: output falls steeply initially and recovers afterwards. More recently,
Indonesia after the fall of Suharto and his network in 1998 exhibited a similar
response.
For other parameter choices too10,w eﬁnd that the sudden drop in ϕt
without a change in λt, i.e. the advent of laisser-faire capitalism, destroys
much of the existing networks in the economy. The reason is that the new
system inherits a large network and backward technology. Maximizing ﬁrms
have an incentive to upgrade their technology via high Drc
t , which rapidly
destructs old networks.
Beyond the evidence on transition and developing countries quoted, an-
other empirically veriﬁable implication of this model is that the lifting of
barriers to creative destruction should lead to high demand for labor involved
in networking, i.e. LRC
t ., as opposed to production work. This should be ob-
servable as swift changes in rewards for making contacts. Such an immediate
change has indeed been documented for Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec
1997), Russia (Brainerd, 1998; Sabirianova and Sabirianova, 2003 ) the Czech
Republic (Flanagan, 1998) and China (Lee, 1999). These demonstrate that
the returns to management skills, and more generally the skill wage premium,
rose quickly and immediately after the start of the institutional changes.
10We searched amongst the grid deﬁned by γ0 ∈ {0.5,0.65,0.8}, γ ∈ {0.6,0.7},
g0 ∈ {0.2,0.5,1},g 1 ∈ {0.5,1.5,4}, λ(.) ∈ {0.2,0.4,0.8}, β = {1,5},y (.) ∈ {Cobb-
Douglas,CES} .
22T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of high levels of creative destruction on the total
level of RC in the ﬁrst periods generate a strong contraction in yt. Because
of complementaries, it is accompanied by a reduction in the marginal value
of other production factors labor and capital. This concurs with observed
increasing incidences of poverty and capital ﬂight after market liberalization
measures, of which the post-socialist transition is again an extreme example.
After liberalization, productivity would increase in the surviving ﬁrms
due to the creative destruction they implement. Pavcnik (2000), using plant-
level panel data on Chilean manufacturers, ﬁnds evidence of within plant
productivity improvements following the Chilean liberalization of the early
1980s. She attributes this to ‘the reshuﬄing of resources and output from
less to more eﬃcient producers’. Similarly, Lall (1999) researches the gar-
ment industry in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, based on ﬁrm-level data,
and ﬁnds technology upgrading and improving ﬁrm performance in response
to liberalization. Grant (2001) similarly reports reallocation of enterprise
relations in Ghana after reforms. In particular, his analysis points to in-
creasing service-sector performance. Abandoning local control in particular
lead to rapid re-alignments in Ghana, with foreign companies establishing
joint ventures, developing local products, and joining national stock markets.
These are indications that constituent ﬁrms were changing their production
processes, their input suppliers and their clients. This may be interpreted as
evidence of much contact replacement Dt.
We now turn to the optimal development path, i.e. the path of a social
planner who would take the externalities of creative destruction into account.
In Figure 4c, the super-planner chooses Drc
t such that there is an initial
output fall of about 30%. The initial levels of creative destruction are about
30% of that of the decentralized transition. The economy recovers to its old
level after 10 periods, with high growth levels recorded in the early years.
Growth in this period is fuelled by growth in the technology used. As in the
earlier simulation, output growth eventually tails oﬀ to the level of exogenous
progress of the technological frontier.
23The interesting question is how any realistic policy can mimic the super-
planner solution. The dilemma is that in practice no planner can engage in
creative destruction since this requires decentralized information; but decen-
tralized creative destruction overshoots. An observed policy is a dual track
approach. In the case of China some restrictions on the mobility of labor
and capital are maintained (Tian, 1999). As Roland and Verdier (2003)
comment, such ”...dualism follows the scenario of Chinese transition where
the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a
liberalized non-state sector follows market rules”. In terms of our model, the
Chinese experience is a way to restrict the actions of a sizeable proportion
of the ﬁrms in the economy, allowing only a fraction to engage in creative
destruction, hence avoiding a cumulation of the external eﬀects.11
The simulations above suggested that our model is capable of capturing
observed economic dynamics after a momentous liberalization. Obviously,
the speed of recovery varies tremendously with parameter variations, but the
qualitative ﬁnding of an output drop caused by a collapse of RC followed by
a recovery appeared in all parameter values examined.
4.2 Scenario 2: gradual but inevitable system changes
In Scenario 1,i tw a se ﬀectively presumed that political institutions changed
suddenly and completely, whilst there was no change in the rate at which
individuals could make contacts. For many developing countries, it would
seem more apt to assume that both political barriers and contact rates move
slowly towards perfect markets. We leave the question of the endogeneity of
such changes till the next subsection and here take them as inevitable.
More precisely, starting from the same conditions as above, we assume
that from t =0onwards ϕt =1+ϕ0e−αϕ∗t and λt = λ3 ∗ (1 − e−λ2−λ4∗t).
11Additionaly, after the reform often local party members obtained the means of pro-
duction form state companies (Lin, 2001). This realigns incentives and implies in our
model a reduction of ϕ.L e e ( 1999) shows that these companies experience high growth
rates.
24This describes slowly adjusting ϕt and λt. We take ϕ0 = 1000, αϕ =0 .05,
λ4 =0 .01, λ2 =0 .05 and λ3 ∗ (1 − e−λ2)=λ0. These assumptions mean we
allow ϕt to halve its distance towards 1 about every 8 years, and λt to halve
its distance towards λ3 every 40 years. We show simulations with diﬀerent
choices later.
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Again we ﬁnd a sharp decrease in RC with the decentralized path. It is
interesting that the optimal path includes maintaining RC for the ﬁrst 20
years, illustrating the large negative externality of creative destruction on
growth.
We here leave aside the actual composition of the increases in community
social capital and market institutions (captured by a growing λt). In practice,
market institutions may well replace CSC due to increasing returns to scale.
25Case studies document such substitution in banking (Ferrary 2003) and legal
systems in the case of China (Winn 2002).
4.3 Scenario 3: endogeneity of system change
We here model politics, CSC, and MI, as the result of the aggregate of indi-
vidual choices and thereby as externalities of individual economic choices.
The ﬁrst endogeneity in this simulation is that the total size of the rela-
tional capital network aﬀects the contact rate positively, making RC and λt
part of an autocatalytic process. Such an argument arises from both classic
search theory and the social capital literature. Diamond (1982) argued in a
seminal article that the arrival rate of contacts in search economies is likely
to be linked to the number of units in the market. With more buyers and
sellers in a market, the probability of ﬁnding a match increases. This thick-
market externality argument also appears in Howitt and McAfee (1992). The
argument carries over to relational capital building in developing economies,
and we model this explicitly in Appendix 1.2.
Market institutions with economies of scale have this feedback. Their set-
up costs can only be aﬀorded once the market for contacts is suﬃciently large.
The social capital literature provides a similar argument about informal net-
works and trust. The growth of informal networks increases exponentially.
The larger the number of contacts of each entity in a network, the faster
the network grows and the more trust evolves. Sobel (2002) describes how
having many business contacts makes it easier to access information about
other individuals, which in turn promotes the returns to reputation. These
arguments suggest that there is a self-enforcing mechanism whereby growth
in the overall network increases the contact rate, which spurs further growth
in the network. This may create a virtuous circle until a maximum contact
rate is reached. Conversely, in very small networks the feedback may lead
to a downward spiral that accentuates any exogenous drop in the stock of
relational capital in the economy.
The second endogeneity we allow is that more RC leads to reduced po-
26litical barriers to creative destruction. Contacts can be used as channels of
information and manipulation, and are therefore a means to inﬂuence poli-
tics (Guy, 2000).12 This power can be used to decrease the costs of creative
destruction costs by on the one hand lobbying for MI and on the other hand
by controlling politicians (for example via the press). This argument fol-
lows the literature on the importance of civil society for growth. We argue
that growing entrepreneurial networks transform the nature of the polity to
decrease political interference. This appears to be occurring in present-day
Cuba, Vietnam, and China.
The consequences of these feedback eﬀects are ex ante ambiguous. By
making creative destruction cheaper, the political activities of a growing net-
work can lead to more creative destruction and hence a contraction of the
network. The feed-back can lead to cyclical behavior in creative destruction
and ϕt, until at some point the network becomes so large, even after periods
of large creative destruction, that the political feedback of changes in RC
becomes of marginal importance.
We model this endogeneity by taking ϕt =1+ϕ0e−βϕ∗RCt−1 and λt =
λ5 ln(e+RCt−1)ln(e+¯ yt−1) where βϕ =0 .4, and λ5 ln(e+RC−1)ln(e+¯ y−1)=
λ0 which means λ5 =0 .2846. Again, we will vary these assumptions later.
Simulation presented in ﬁgures 6a and 6b result.
12For a more developed model on this speciﬁc issue, see Dulleck and Frijters (2003), who
stress the importance of rents from a resource sector (e.g. oil or minerals) to the behavior
of politicians.
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Note the political cycles in the decentralized case, where only after 50
years the economy escapes the trap noted above.13 Note also that the op-
timal development path ﬁrst entails a period in which the RC network is
expanded until φ is very low, i.e. ﬁrst the political inﬂuence of politicians
on the economy is removed. Only after that does the economy follow a path
reminiscent of the decentralized path.
13Political cycles and the frequent un-doing of reforms after elections is, according to
the historical analysis of Block (2002), a frequent phenomenon in African countries.
284.4 Robustness analysis
We had some empirics to guide us with respect to basic economic para-
meter assumptions. Yet there is simply nothing as yet to base λt and ϕt
upon. For this reason, we give below the decentralized results for alterna-
tive assumptions. The main point we take from this is that results change
commensurately with changes in the key parameters.
In the second endogenous simulation, for instance, the growth trap due to
political institutions is so deep, and the contact rates so low, that even after
200 periods, the economy has not yet realized fast growth (average growth is
less than 1.5% a year in this period). In the fourth endogenous growth path,
the political growth trap is so small that the economy virtually immediately
starts catching up and enters the steady state growth path after about 60
years.
In the ﬁrst three exogenous growth paths, we see qualitatively a similar
growth path to the one in the main text, i.e. initial decades of very low
RC due to initial creative destruction. Only after 20 years does the growth
in λt allow the economy to achieve high growth levels. Interestingly, in the
exogenous simulations where the political reform is slower (αϕ is low in simu-
lations 4 to 5), the initial collapse of RC does not occur and sustained growth
appears almost immediately.
This dependence of development paths on parameter choices reﬂects the
importance of initial conditions but also the importance of contact rates -
depending, in turn, on market institutions and CSC - and the level of political
interference with the market.
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With 1.: αϕ =0 .1, βϕ =0 .8; With 2.: αϕ =0 .1, λ2 =0 .1, βϕ =0 .2.
With 3.: αϕ =0 .1, λ2 =0 .1, λ4 =0 .02, βϕ =0 .2, λ5 =2∗ 0.2846
With 4.: αϕ =0 .025, λ2 =0 .1, λ4 =0 .02, βϕ =0 .4, λ5 =2∗ 0.2846
With 5.: αϕ =0 .025, λ2 =0 .1, λ4 =0 .005, βϕ =0 .8, λ5 =2∗ 0.2846
305 Conclusions
As our centerpiece in this paper, we introduce the notion of Relational Cap-
ital. RC represents the stock of contacts of individuals in an economy. By
most accounts, this is an important component of social capital. In our
model, RC is an input into sold output. Community Social Capital (CSC),
which is constituted by informal networks, as well as Market Institutions en-
hance the labour eﬃciency of creating RC. Political interference in our model
increases the costs of breaking up contacts among ﬁrms. We argue that this
breaking up of contacts is an integral part of technological advancement. If
the political process restricts such creative destruction by raising its costs,
technological backwardness results.
In our approach, economic systems that exhibit high degrees of central-
ization, bureaucratic interference, regulation or corruption, lag behind in the
level of technology employed. If these economies liberalize, they are likely
to experience an initial output fall: technological catch-up potential implies
high initial levels of destroyed and replaced relational capital - which incor-
porates a large negative external eﬀect. In the simulations such drops indeed
occurred endogenously from the optimising behaviour of rational ﬁrms. A
policy conclusion of our model is support for smoother reforms such as ‘dual
track’ approaches discussed in the literature. Complete systemic change only
in new sectors of the economy is one policy instrument to restrict some of
the externalities created by creative destruction.
The simulations revealed another interesting empirical implication. With
endogenous feedbacks from the size of the economy to the costs of replac-
ing and making contacts, we ﬁnd cycles. These quasi business cycles reveal
an interesting coordination phenomenon. When an economy is close to the
technology frontier, investment in new contacts is more productive than re-
placing a contact. Once the economy is far from the frontier the opposite is
true. Coordination of activity follows from the observation that new contacts
live longer if most of the economy refrains from replacing contacts, hence the
relative cost of replacing a contact is high. Vice versa, new contacts have a
31low survival rate if the economy engages heavily in replacing contacts. In this
situation replacing a contact is relatively cheap. A full dynamic analysis of
these endogenous cycles constitutes an interesting extension of our analysis.
In our analysis, the political system was implicitly deﬁned as a function
of the total stock of RC. The feedback from large networks to less political
frustration of the replacement of contacts needs a further foundation. These
might develop as a result of maximizing behavior. In ongoing work (Dulleck
and Frijters 2003) we study how and to what extent those in power frustrate
the growth of relational capital, simply because it poses a political threat to
their power.
Another avenue for further investigation centers around parameter β.
We assume that the complexity of production is exogenous to the model and
time-invariant. In our model β measures the length of a production chain as a
proxy for such complexity. It determines the number of ﬁrms that are aﬀected
by the creative destruction of one element in the chain. A further step in
the analysis would be to endogenize β. The endogeneity of this parameter
may capture the development of productivity in relation to the division of
labor. Empirical observations by Hedlund and Sundstrom (1996) show that
liberalization mostly aﬀects those ﬁrms with the highest value-added, which
usually have the most complex production processes. The ‘primitivization’
of transitional economies can be seen as an endogenous reduction of β.
This set of applications and open questions shows the potential of our
framework. We oﬀer this as one way to go beyond the aggregation question
in the social capital literature, and to connect the debate to the political
economy of growth and development.
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38Appendix 1: a search model of relational capital.
Appendix 1.1 The basic model of RC
In this appendix we motivate the macro-model of creative destruction by
a micro-search model. We will borrow arguments from the search literature
by exploiting the analogy with the matching process of vacancies and job-
seekers (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).
Denote the number of contacts a representative individual ﬁrm i has by
Ci. Denote the number of extra contacts a ﬁrm makes by Ni and the number
of contacts it replaces by Di. Take the number of ﬁrms M to be large, such
that the proportion of contacts any ﬁrms has is approximately zero. When
ﬁrm i replaces an old contact with a new one, it looses a previous contact. The
ﬁrm j with whom ﬁrm i makes a replacement contact also loses a previous
contact. Hence both ﬁrm i and j remain with the same number of contacts
as before. The externality is that the two ﬁrms that i and j were previously
connected to, lose a contact. If these former contacts were necessary links in
an e t w o r ko fk contacts, the net loss of contacts is β =2 k − 1.T h en u m b e r
of existing, new, and destroyed contacts is assumed large enough to be able
to abstract from indivisibilities.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, ﬁrms seek extra
contacts and replacement contacts. Then, these latent contacts materialize,
after which production takes place. Then, the technology to be used next
period is updated.
The probability of any contact surviving the process of creative destruc-
tion is equal to (1 − 1 P
i Ci)
P
j6=i βDj which is in the limit (M →∞ )e q u a lt o
e−β
¯ D
¯ C. The number of contacts of ﬁrm i after creative destruction and extra
contacts is equal to Ci ∗e−β
¯ D
¯ C +Ni. Adding time subscripts and re-labelling,
this is the same as the formula for RCt g i v e ni nt h em a i nt e x t . N o t et h a t
here the replacement contacts are treated as cumulative, i.e. it is possible
to replace the same initial contact several times in one period, leading to a
larger technological improvement. In contrast, extra contacts are additive.
39Appendix 1.2 Modelling the endogeneity of contact rates
We can similarly give a micro-foundation for λ(.), i.e. the relation be-
tween labor invested into making new contacts, the number of old contacts
and the number of new (extra and replacement) contacts. We again exploit
the analogy with job search. We thus envisage the process of ﬁnding con-
tacts as follows: denote the amount of labor ﬁrm i allocates towards creating
extra contacts by LN,i and the amount allocated towards replacing contacts
by LD,i. This labor is directly and linearly transformed into ‘active contact
vacancies’ whereby the old contacts involved in replacements are only ac-
tually destroyed if a partner for the replacement contact is found. We can
hence also use (LN,i + LD,i) to denote the number of contact vacancies ﬁrm
i has. We then have a symmetric matching situation whereby LN,i number
of potential contacts of each ﬁrm get matched to the
P
j6=i LN,j potential ex-
tra contacts of other ﬁrms. The total amount of extra contacts can then be




j6=i LN,j). As Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) show, there are several micro-mechanisms via which
we can arrive at a linear matching function, implying that the total number
of extra contacts is linear in the number of potential extra contacts. One
such possible mechanism is that each individual latent contact has a ﬁxed
probability λ of being ‘noticed’, which is a ‘ﬁxed advertisement space’ as-
sumption. All these ‘noticed’ latent contacts then get randomly matched to
each other. This then indeed would imply a constant returns to scale match-
ing function and a linear relation between the amount of labor devoted to
making extra and replacement contacts and the number of new extra and
replacement contacts.
The political process can now be summarised by the assumption that
politicians allow a contact replacement to go ahead with probability 1
φt.T o -
gether with the above, this means we get λt∗(LN,it+LD,it)=φtDit+Nit, which
is the same formula as the one in the text.
Now, we can also endogenize λ in a way that links it to the number of
contacts already existing in the economy. A natural possibility is to assume
40that it is the two sides of an ‘old’ contact via which latent contacts get noticed.
Assume for instance that there is a constant probability that a latent match is
productive termed λ0. The probability that a latent contact is observed by an
existing contact is inﬁnitesimally small and denoted by λ1. The probability
that an individual latent contact gets labelled as a ‘noticed and productive’
contact is then equal to λ0 ∗ (1 − (1 − λ1)
P
j6=i Cj) which converges to λ0 ∗
(1 − e−λ1M ¯ C). In terms of the formulas in the text, this would mean the
function λ(RCt−1)=λ0 ∗ (1 − e−λ1RCt−1) is a natural candidate which has
the standard convexity properties. Various other micro-mechanisms leading
to such relations also exist however. The key aspect is that the thick-market
externality of Diamond (1982) is incorporated. In the example above, this
thick-market externality is incorporated in the assumption that each side
of an existing contact has an independent probability of noticing a latent
contact. This is a network externality of having many existing contacts.
Appendix 1.3 Foundation of the process of technological change
Finally, we can think of the following stylized micro-foundation to our
process of technological change. Take each representative ﬁrm to consist of
a ﬁxed number of labour units, say Z units. The technology used by each
labour unit i depends on one contact (eg. the machine provider or the service
department of another ﬁrm). Diﬀerent units in the same ﬁrm may or may
not use the same contact as the technology source. Each labour unit i then
combines the other contacts and capital to produce sold output. Economies
of scale ensure that at the ﬁrm level yt increases with RCt. Now, the technol-
ogy of the match between unit i and her contact is on average At−1.T h eﬁrm
can search for more contacts (Nt) and/or to ﬁnd diﬀerent technology con-
tacts (Dt). If a unit i changes a technology contact, her previous technology
contact becomes redundant because economies of scale in doing any speciﬁc
task make the productivity of unit i highest when working only with one
technology contact (eg. using one word processing program is more eﬃcient
that working with two simultaneously). The ﬁrm observes two equally sized
sets of candidate contacts it can search from, one for Dt and one for Nt.
41The equal size assumption means the symmetry assumed in the matching
stories above between Dt and Nt remains valid, and the previous matching
arguments go though after appropriate normalisation. The distribution of
technical productivity of potential ‘diﬀerent’ contacts is in continuous ﬂux:
every period, the productivity that unit i would have with a diﬀerent tech-
nology contact j is drawn from a c.d.f. Ht(.),w h e r eHt(At−1)=0and
Ht(At−1 + ga(A∗
t−1 − At−1)) = 1.T h i sm e a n saﬁrm can observe ‘a region of
potential better matches’ that lie within a fraction ga between the produc-
tivity of a current match and the technological frontier. One can think of
Ht(.) as the result of an exogenous, random, and continuous learning process
that other potential matches undergo whilst they are inactive. The expected





t−1 − At−1). Within one period, the process of ﬁnd-
i n gad i ﬀerent set of matches starting from the current (potentially latent)
technology can be repeated many times in the same period until the even-
tual set of contacts is ﬁnally eﬀectuated and the old ones are severed. If
g0 is small, then the expected result of one period of technological change
goes to At−1 +( 1− e−g0)(A∗




is the number of ‘rounds of innovation’ per labour unit in the period. When
Mt is reasonably small, the probability of any contact surviving the contact
destruction by other ﬁrms will approach e−β
¯ D
¯ C.
If we add an exogenous probability (1 − g1) that the ﬁrm is completely
mistaken about each unit’s set of potential new technology contacts (where
the mistake is revealed only after all rounds of innovation), and relate Mt to
Dt, then we get the technological progress function speciﬁed in the simula-
tions.
Appendix 2: Steady state.
Because of creative destruction, there will be long term technological progress
equalling the rate of progress in the technological frontier. This growth in
42technological progress is taken advantage of by a non-zero steady state level
of Drc
t . This in turn leads to a non-zero steady state level of Nrc
t because the
relational capital destroyed by the actions of other ﬁrms has to be replen-
ished.
More formally, when the steady state levels of Drc
t ,N rc
t , and RCt are






We will use that in the steady state ∂At
∂Ds =( 1− g(D∗))t−s−1 A∗
tg0(D∗)α
α+g(D∗) for any




























The ﬁrst two equations are self-explanatory. The third equation solves
RC∗ to equate the beneﬁt of improved technology via increasing DT to the
individual wage cost of D. Because maximization is done on the individual
level, the cost an individual ﬁrm uses does not include the externality of D∗ on
the level of RC of others. The fourth equation solves RC∗ and thereby N∗ by
equating the discounted beneﬁts of extra RCt to the wage costs. Because of
the convexities in g(.),a n dy(.), existence of equilibrium is assured (though
it may not be stable or unique). In the steady state wt =( 1+α)t−TwT,
rt = r∗, and At =( 1+α)t−TAT. We make no claim about the stability of
the economy close to this steady state, or indeed about the uniqueness of the
development path under all parameters.
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